Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity' and 'works'

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36 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck]
Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck]
Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck]
We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck]
We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Beauty motivates morality, by harmonising feeling and reason [Schiller, by Pinkard]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Schiller speaks obsessively of freedom throughout his works [Schiller, by Berlin]